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The Relation between Regulation and Class Actions: 
Evidence from the Insurance Industry  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Michael Avery, Mark Covington, Sam DeFrank, Carly Vickers and Todd Shadle 
were each involved in separate relatively minor traffic accidents in the early 1990s. Each 
of their accidents required minimal repairs to their vehicles.1 Their insurer, State Farm, 
had a policy of repairing damaged cars with parts that were not made by the original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM). The use of non-OEM parts would have reduced each 
individual’s bill between $45 and $155. Avery and Shadle opted for OEM parts and paid 
the cost difference themselves.  The others had their vehicles repaired using non-OEM 
parts.  
In 1997, these five drivers along with almost2 all other State Farm customers who 
had non-OEM parts installed on their vehicles or who paid the difference between OEM 
and non-OEM parts were included in a class of about 4.5 million people.3  The plaintiff 
class alleged that State Farm’s policy of using non-OEM parts was a breach of contract 
because the insurer promised to restore their cars to their pre-loss conditions.4  They 
further alleged that State Farm had committed fraud by violating Illinois consumer 
                                                 
1 Michael Avery was a resident of Louisiana, Mark Covington, of Mississippi; Carly Vickers, of 
Pennsylvania, and Todd Shadle, of Massachusetts. Sam DeFrank was a resident of Illinois, the state in 
which the case was adjudicated. 
2 Residents from Arkansas and Tennessee were not included. 
3 Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., WL 955543 and WL 1022134 (not reported in N.E., 2d, 1999) 
(Ill. Cir., 1999).  See State Farm Media Backgrounder for estimate of class size available at 
http://www.statefarm.com/about /media/backgrounder/avery_sf.asp (last accessed on March 12, 2009). 
4 WL 955543 
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protection statutes.5  The alleged violation resulted, according to the plaintiffs, from the 
inferiority of OEM parts.  
In many ways this litigation illustrates the tension between administrative 
regulation and class action litigation.  The alleged damages to each individual plaintiff in 
the case were so small that the action would not have been brought without the class 
action procedural mechanism.  The question at issue was whether non-OEM parts were 
really inferior to OEM parts.  
In this class action, State Farm faced litigation on behalf of anyone in 48 states 
who had her car repaired with non-OEM parts.  The aggregated damage judgment in the 
initial cases was 1.2 billion dollars.6 This represents a sum equal to one third of State 
Farm’s net income in 2007.7  Faced with the possibility of such large damages most 
defendants would have settled and discontinued the use of non-OEM parts. State Farm 
did the latter but it did not settle. The judgment against State Farm was overturned but 
not before the case had altered company policy toward non-OEM parts in 48 states. 8 
While the State Farm case is atypical in its size, the cumulative effects of several class 
actions against a company can have a similar effect on a firm’s practices.9 
                                                 
5 WL 1022134 
6 WL 955543 and WL 1022134 
7 2007 Annual Report to State Farm Mutual Policyholders available at 
http://www.statefarm.com/_pdf/2007annualreport.pdf (last accessed on March 12, 2009). 
8 The class was certified on July 1997 in Williamson County, Ill. On October 4, 1999 a jury awarded $456 
million to the plaintiffs for breach of contract.  This award was followed four days later by an additional 
award of $730 million dollars for consumer fraud made by Judge John Speroni. The award included $600 
million in punitive damages. On April 5, 2001 the Appellate Court reduced the verdict by $130 million but 
let stand $1.05 billion of the award. In 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned judgment against State 
Farm. The Court unanimously ruled that class should not have been certified because it was too broad and 
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either a breach of contract or consumer fraud. 
9 See Nicholas Pace, Stephen Carroll, Ingo Vogelsang, and Nishal Ramphal. Insurance Class Actions in the 
United States (2007) for a discussion of the size distribution of insurance class actions. 
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This change in policy would not be surprising if virtually every state had not 
previously regulated the issue of whether insurers could use non-OEM parts. In the 
majority of states such regulations existed implying the states had examined the issue. 
Non-OEM parts were allowed in Illinois if their use was disclosed on the consumer’s 
estimates, the parts were of like kind and quality, the manufacturer was identified on the 
part, and a warrantee was provided. Illinois already had regulations designed to balance 
the competing goals of lower costs versus higher quality repairs. In effect, the litigation 
created a parallel system of regulation. 
On one level operating a system of state regulation and a parallel system of regulation 
through the courts is redundant and potentially contradictory. Further the system 
generates its own administrative costs. In the 27 cases in the RAND Insurance Class 
Action database that reported attorneys’ fees, the average fee award constituted 29 
percent of the gross common fund.  The median award was 30 percent, and the largest 
award was 41 percent.10 This is slightly higher than the Eisenberg and Miller estimate of 
22 percent,11 but it is consistent with some other findings in the literature.12 This does not 
include defense costs or the cost of administering the case by the courts. 
The operation of potentially redundant and expensive regulatory systems might be 
justified on two grounds: 
1)  Administrative regulation and class actions can both be used in the process of 
controlling behavior with states alternating in their use depending on which one 
                                                 
10 Pace, supra note __, xxiii. 
11 Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller. Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical 
Study. 1 J. Emp. Leg. Stud. 27, 51-52 (2004). 
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can be operated more cheaply on the margin.  That is, the two systems serve as 
substitutes in the regulatory production function in the same way that 
manufacturers use both labor and capital in producing goods but, on the margin, 
more labor implies less capital and vice versa; 
2) Class actions allow consumers to influence regulatory policy when administrative 
regulators are captured by industry. 
The first hypothesis is that regulation via an administrative office and regulation by 
the courts using class actions are simply substitutes. In the context of insurance class 
actions, if the regulators prevent insurers from defrauding customers, then there is no 
harm to generate litigation in the future. We should observe class actions more frequently 
when regulators allow more harm to occur and hence more damage to generate litigation. 
In effect regulation represents a floor.  The choice is not either administrative regulation 
or class actions; administrative regulation represents the minimum standard that courts 
can go beyond if the agency in question has not protected consumers at the relevant legal 
standard.  In effect regulation represents a minimal level of deterrence that does not 
require litigation but if that level is insufficient, then litigation will provide the additional 
deterrence required.  
To take a prominent example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
long argued that private security litigation is a substitute for SEC fines.  This division of 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Thomas Willging, Laurel Hooper, and Robert Niemic. Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal 
District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 14 (1996) available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23pdf/$file/rule23.pdf (last accessed on March 12, 2009). 
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labor, it is argued, frees up enforcement resources and allows the SEC to target firms that 
private attorneys would not.13  
The second justification for operating a dual system is the possibility of regulatory 
capture.  Economists, starting with Stigler, have argued that regulators are likely to be 
captured by the industry they regulate.14 The source of this capture is a collective action 
problem.  The cost to an industry resulting from regulation is concentrated, while the 
benefits to consumers from the regulation are diffuse.  For example, in the case of price 
regulation, no consumer has an incentive to lobby the regulator to control prices as the 
individual gains are too small to warrant the effort of lobbying. Regulated industries, on 
the other hand, have incentives to lobby for more generous rate increases.15  
Pace, et al argue that since courts are less likely to be captured by industry than a 
regulatory agency with a single jurisdiction, class actions can represent a check on the 
ability of industry to determine regulatory policy.16  The point extends beyond regulated 
prices. In the case of breast implants, Hersch argues that the initial motivation of the 
consumer class actions was a perception that regulation was lax because the FDA was 
unwilling to actively monitor medical devices.17  In some cases, such as lawsuits against 
handgun manufacturers, the argument goes even one step further.  The political process, 
according to proponents, is deadlocked and unable to produce meaningful safety 
                                                 
13 For a critical view of this position, see Amanda Rose. Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: 
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5. 108 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1301, 1309 (2008). 
14 George Stigler. The Theory of Economic Regulation 2 Bell J. Econ. Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971). 
15 See Dennis Mueller. Public Choice III, 344-345 (2003) and cites therein. 
16 Pace et al, supra note __, 68.  
17 Hersch, Joni. Breast Implants: Regulation, Litigation and Science. Regulation through Litigation, W. Kip 
Viscusi, editor, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, D.C. (2002). 
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regulation. The courts offer an avenue to a “more rational” standard for consumer 
protection.18  
In this article, we examine the two competing justifications for the parallel system 
using evidence from insurance class actions and regulation. Insurance regulation in the 
United States is largely in the hands of the states. Although regulatory agencies are 
similar in many respects, it is not an overstatement to say that the US has 51 separate 
regulatory regimes for insurance. State regulation generally focuses on two areas: 
solvency regulation and market regulation.  Solvency regulation, which requires insurers 
to maintain adequate reserves and guaranty funds and meet financial disclosure 
requirements, is relatively homogenous across states. But market regulation, which 
regulates insurance products, practices, and prices, varies dramatically. We use this 
variation to evaluate the link between insurance regulation and class action litigation.   
 We test whether regulation and litigation are substitutes on the margin.  
Specifically, if regulation has some deterrent value, the probability that a company 
commits a wrongful act is a function of the level of regulation. This implies that more 
active regulators should be associated with less harm in their jurisdictions. Once a harm 
or perceived harm occurs, the case enters the civil justice system if the plaintiff’s attorney 
expects that the case is likely to be successful and financially viable.19  
We use data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
concerning the regulatory environment in each state. We link this data to a unique 
                                                 
18 Philip Cook and Jens Ludwig. Litigation as Regulation: Firearms. Regulation through Litigation, W. Kip 
Viscusi, editor, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, D.C. (2002). 
19 Eric Helland and Jonathan Klick. The Tradeoffs Between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from 
Insurance Class Actions. 1 J. Tort. L. Article 2 (2006) examines the relationship between harm generation 
while controlling for the likelihood of litigation. 
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dataset, the RAND Insurance Class Action database.  The data on class actions20 contains 
information on class actions against firms in the insurance industry for 748 distinct cases 
that were open at least once during the period of 1992 to 2002.  Because the data is 
reasonably comprehensive for the companies responding to the survey, we are able to 
link the frequency of class action litigation to the states’ insurance regulation data. 
We examine four different facets of the regulation litigation tradeoff.  The first is 
to examine whether regulator’s interest in a particular cause of action reduces the 
likelihood that class actions covering this cause of action will be filed in the regulator’s 
home state. We also examine several measures of regulatory stringency in the state to 
determine whether there is a substitution effect between regulatory action and litigation. 
For example, we use state regulatory budgets as a proxy for regulatory stringency, a 
factor that varies enormously from state to state, examining the relationship between 
levels of stringency and the incidence of class actions.    
We also examine whether class actions are less frequent when regulators issued 
an administrative decision on a particular issue previously or if there are no existing state 
laws on the particular issue.  In a system where regulation and litigation are substitutes, if 
regulators are silent, then the private attorneys are more likely to step in. Using OEM 
parts cases, we examine whether states that have not issued rulings on the use of non-
OEM parts have more OEM class actions.  Since the issue is unsettled, the theory goes, 
class actions in effect fill the regulatory void.   
 To test the second hypothesis—that regulatory capture induces insurance class 
actions—we examine differences in insurance rates between states that elect their 
                                                 
20 For a full description of this dataset, see Pace et al, supra note __. 
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insurance commissioners and those that appoint them. Several studies have examined the 
link between insurance rates and whether insurance commissioners are chosen through 
elections or by appointment. The findings from these studies suggest that regulatory 
capture, which is revealed in the form of higher prices, is less likely when commissioners 
are elected then when they are appointed.  Building on these studies, we look for a 
relationship between the election of commissioners and the frequency of class actions in 
a state.  
Finally we examine other factors, not directly related to the two hypotheses that 
potentially determine the likelihood of a class action filing.  While these factors do not 
directly speak to the link between regulation and class actions, they are related to the 
potential influences on the observed patterns of class action filings.  Specifically we 
examine the impact of electing judges on patterns of filing.  The hypothesis is that elected 
judges are more sympathetic to plaintiffs and hence class actions are more likely to be 
filed in states that elect their judges.  Lastly, we examine the impact of pervious litigation 
both in the state and the specific line of litigation. 
Understanding the relationship between litigation and regulation, especially as it 
relates to the insurance industry, takes on special importance given the current financial 
crisis.  The uproar over the government’s $170 billion commitment to bailout American 
International Group (AIG),21 along with similar (though less dramatic) problems among 
other insurers, may be a harbinger of sweeping changes in how we regulate the insurance 
industry in the U.S.   
                                                 
21 See, for example, Gretchen Morgenson. A.I.G. Bailout Priorities Are in Critics’ Cross Hairs. New York 
Times, March 17, 2009. 
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The next section discusses the nature of insurance regulations and provides some 
background on class action litigation necessary to motivate our empirical investigation.  
We then discuss the data and examine the evidence for a substitution between 
administrative regulation and class actions.  Section 2 provides evidence on the 
relationship between regulatory capture, as measured by the election of insurance 
commissioners, and class action frequency.  Section 3 provides comprehensive regression 
results from a model including all of determinants of class action filings and presents 
evidence on the relationship between filing decisions as the outcome of previous class 
actions in the state.  Section 4 offers some concluding remarks and directions for further 
study. 
I. CLASS ACTION LITIGATION AS REGULATION 
 
There are several theoretical motivations for why we might observe a tradeoff 
between regulation and class actions.  In particular, the seminal Shavell model of the 
relationship between regulation and litigation provides a useful starting point.22  Shavell’s 
model provides conditions for the efficient use of both regulation and litigation in a 
system geared toward incentivizing individuals to take the socially optimal level of care.  
As is evident from the Shavell model, liability and regulation serve as substitutes on the 
margin.  That is, all other things equal, as the regulatory standard (or enforcement level in 
the real world setting where not all violations are discovered by the regulator23) is raised, 
                                                 
22 Steven Shavell. A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation. 15 RAND J. Econ. 271 
(1984) and Steven Shavell. Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety. 13 J. Leg. Stud. 357 (1984).   
23 Although the Shavell model does not distinguish between the standard and its enforcement (i.e., he 
assumes that any standard can be enforced perfectly), in the real world, standards are not self-enforcing. 
This implies that for any given standard, care achieved will be a function of enforcement.  For simplicity, 
we will use the term standard to imply enforcement levels throughout this paper. 
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there is less need for liability in generating socially optimal behavior.24  In fact, in the 
limit, if the regulatory standard is set above the social value of the harm avoided, we will 
have too much care taken in which case any additional care induced by liability will be 
pure social waste.  Further, as a positive matter, the higher the regulatory standard, the 
less harm that will occur, leaving a smaller domain for litigation, all other things equal.   
 For our purposes, another element of Shavell’s model that is interesting is his 
claim that regulation is most useful in contexts where harm across parties is similar, 
whereas litigation is most useful when there is a high degree of variability across 
parties.25  By focusing on class actions, where, by definition, the harms are similar across 
parties, we mitigate the importance of this element of the Shavell model.  
 
A. Data Background 
To investigate the relationship between litigation and regulation, we use a unique 
data source covering the experience of insurance companies with class action litigation. 
The dataset, described more completely in Pace et al., contains information on class 
actions against firms in the insurance industry derived from 988 case-level surveys from 
130 insurance companies, describing 748 distinct cases that were open at least once 
during the period of 1992 to 2002.26 The information was gathered through a survey that 
concentrated on larger insurance companies in the property-casualty, life, and health 
markets. The complete dataset contains information on cases filed between 1984 and 
                                                 
24 This is seen most easily in Steven Shavell. A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety 
Regulation. 15 RAND J. Econ. 271, 275 (Figure 2) and 276 (Figure 3) (1984). 
25 Steven Shavell. A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation. 15 RAND J. Econ. 271, 
274 (1984). 
26 Pace, supra note __, Chapter 2. 
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2002.  The survey asked the responding companies to describe, for each such case in 
which they were a named defendant, the courts of filing and disposition, the names of 
other defendants in the case, whether there were also similar cases filed earlier or in other 
jurisdictions, the lines of insurance involved, the key allegations of the plaintiffs, key 
statutes involved, whether the issue of regulatory jurisdiction was raised by any of the 
parties, the description of the actual or putative class, the geographical scope of the actual 
or putative class, the outcome of any certification process, the manner in which the case 
was resolved, and the details of any settlement or trial verdict for the plaintiffs.27 Table 1 
contains the distribution of cases by insurance line. The vast majority of cases in the data 
concern automobile insurance. 
                                                 
27 There are several important limitations of the RAND insurance class action data that are discussed more 
fully in Pace et al. 2007.  The data is biased towards the experiences of insurers responsible for the top 65% 
of all premiums written in their respective markets since the survey was more likely to be returned by 
larger insurers (Pace et al. 2007) Since larger insurers are more likely to be the target of litigation, the 
sample is likely fairly comprehensive. The surveys were only sent to those companies identified in AM 
Best’s data as property and casualty, life, or health insurers.  Thus class actions filed only against re-
insurers or companies not otherwise included in AM Best are not captured by the data. This potentially 
affects the geographic distribution of case as the respondent group, like the insurance industry generally, is 
dominated by relatively larger writers of automobile private passenger policies.  Thus the jurisdictions in 
which the reported cases were litigated are likely to reflect the market penetration of the responding 
companies.  Not all insurance companies write policies in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  Even 
those that do have a national presence do not have the same relative share of the market in each state.  If the 
likelihood that a insurer would be the subject of a class action in a specific jurisdiction bears any 
relationship to the degree to which the insurer writes business in that same jurisdiction, then the 
geographical distribution of our cases will be quite different than if all companies originally contacted had 
responded. One final caveat on the data is required. The cases reported in the survey took place prior to the 
enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).  It is possible that many of the state court 
cases in the sample would have been removed to federal court under CAFA.  If cases continued to be filed 
in state court and removed to federal court, the case the state filing rates used in this study would be 
similar.  A more likely scenario is that the filing patterns in this study have been altered by CAFA. 
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Table 1: Lines of Insurance Involved in the Case 
Lines Percent of All Cases 
Automobile 67.5
Homeowners 12.8
Life 7.1
Workers’ Compensation 6.3
Health 2.4
Multiple Lines 1.2
Annuities 1.2
Earthquake 1.2
Mobile Home 0.9
Source Pace et al. 2007 
 
Figure 1 presents the trends in the overall number of insurance class actions filed 
per year for the 12 companies which were able to provide complete information on their 
experience with class actions between 1994 and 2002. Taking 1994 as the base year we 
then divide the number of cases by 12 to produce a growth rate relative to a base of 1994. 
While the actual numbers of cases remain small, 14 cases in 1994 rising to 68 in 2002, 
the percentage increase is dramatic.  The growth in cases alleging nation wide or multi-
state classes, shown in Figure 2, is also substantial.  The data show the number of 
nationwide and multi-state cases rising from one alleging nationwide status and another 
alleging a multi-state class, up to a high of 19 cases alleging multi-state status in 1999 
and another 16 with an allegation of a nationwide class.  It seems likely that the 
importance of insurance class actions as an alternative regulatory device has grown as 
well. 
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Figure 1: Growth in Insurance Class Actions 
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Figure 2: Growth in Multi-State or Nationwide Class Actions 
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How definitive can we be about the growth in insurance class actions? Two 
important caveats are required about the trends presented above.  Respondents are more 
likely to have reported newer cases.  A number of responding insurers indicated that 
older class actions litigated near the start of our study period were not tracked in a way 
that would allow them to be as identifiable.  For this reason the growth may be less 
dramatic then it appears.28  The second limitation is that we do not generally know the 
size of the class.  A simple explanation of the growth of class actions may well be that 
                                                 
28 See Pace, supra note __, 30 for a discussion of the issues involved in determining the trend of insurance 
class actions 
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earlier cases represented more individuals than later case meaning the overall impact of 
class actions litigation during this period is unchanged.29 
 The cases also concern a number of different allegations. About half of the cases 
involved allegations related to health care providers as assignees of medical benefits in 
automobile policies (either as part of personal injury protection plans in “no-fault” states 
or as 1st party medical payments coverage in “add-on” states), various property coverage 
claims, claims by policyholders or beneficiaries under automobile 
uninsured\underinsured motorist coverage, diminished value claims related to first party 
automobile coverage, and various workers’ compensation issues.  Diminished value 
allegations were the most frequently cited in our data. Appendix 1 Table A1 contains the 
breakdown from the sample of allegations which occur 5 or more times in the data. 
 
B.  Aggregate Relationship between Regulatory Interest and Litigation 
 To confirm that our regulators and class actions are operating in the same 
domains (as is required for us to draw any inference about their substitutability) we 
examine the evidence that the relevant regulators view the issues underlying these class 
actions as falling within their purview.  At a general level, we must address is whether 
regulators are even interested in the same issues as those being litigated in class actions. 
Regulatory interest is clearly related to substitution.  If regulators have the first 
opportunity to deter a harm, the substitution hypothesis would predict that when 
                                                 
29 For this reason in addition to case counts we will examine the number of cases per 1000 residents as a 
proxy for class size (see below). One concern is that the any relationship between resources and class 
action frequency could simply be generated by more populous states having insurance commissions with 
more resources. We would expect, for example that California with its large population would have a 
greater number of class actions than North Dakota. 
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regulators are interested in a specific type of harm that harm is less likely to be alleged in 
a future class action filing, since it is less likely that the harm ever occurred. 
First, we report on a survey that asks state regulators whether they view the 
allegations contained in our sample as coming under their regulatory mandate. To 
determine the relationship between regulator interest and class actions, the RAND 
Institute for Civil Justice conducted a survey in 2005 of staff members of state 
departments of insurance. Seventeen states completed the survey. The survey asked the 
regulators to rank the 260 key allegations made by the plaintiffs in our cases by their 
relationship to the traditional activities of the regulator. Each allegation was ranked on a 
five point scale.  A rating of “1” implied little or no relationship between the particular 
allegation and the regulators traditional activities. A rating of “5” implied a significant 
overlap with the regulators activities. A more complete discussion of the results is 
contained in Pace et al.30   
The across state average rankings ranged from 2.0 for claims alleging that the 
defendants “failed to have settlements reached with minors reviewed and approved by a 
judge” to an average of 5.0 for claims that “the defendants sold coverages in insolvent 
plans or with unlicensed carriers.”  The mean and median adjusted responses were about 
3.6. In Appendix 1 Column 4 and 5 of Table A1, we present the results of a survey of 
state insurance regulators for all allegations which generated more than five cases in the 
class action data.   
Pace et al. (2007) classify regulatory issues with an adjusted response above the 
80th percentile (i.e., those greater than 4.07) as having the “strongest” potential 
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relationship to a state’s regulatory regime.  They further label issues in the bottom 20th 
percentile of all adjusted responses (3.15 and below) as having the “weakest” 
relationship.  Those issues between the 20th and 80th percentile are ranked as having a 
“modest” relationship.31   
Substitution between administrative regulation and class action would predict that 
class actions alleging a particular cause of action should be more frequent when surveyed 
regulators respond that the cause of action is outside their regulatory mandate. Thus, if 
regulators in a state viewed causes of actions alleging that companies “offered inadequate 
amounts for personal mileage reimbursement” (ranking of 2.44) as outside their 
regulatory authority and therefore a type of damage best handled by the courts, we would 
expect to see more cases of this type in the state. 
However, most insurers responded to the survey saying that vanishing premium 
cases were within their regulatory mandate (rank of 4.35).32 Given the level of interest in 
the harm generated by vanishing premiums, we would expect them to be rare in the data. 
In fact, however, our analysis shows that class action frequency has no relationship to 
regulatory interest.  Figure 4, which plots the RAND DOI survey results against the 
number of cases in the data making the specific allegation, shows that cases dealing with 
allegations that are highly salient to local regulators are no more or less frequent that 
those of little interest. 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 Pace, supra note __, Chapter 4. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Vanishing premium cases are causes of action generated by an insurer’s claim that premiums would 
vanish over time offering coverage without a lifetime of payments while reality premiums failed to 
disappear because the assumptions behind the project premiums were unrealistic. 
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Figure 4: DOI Ranking of Allegation and Allegation Frequency 
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 The results of the survey do not suggest that regulation and class actions are 
substitutes at least in terms of regulatory interest. Class actions alleging a particular cause 
of action are no less frequent when the surveyed regulators claim they are more interested 
in that cause of action than when state regulators claim they are less interested in that 
cause of action.  Most of the cases fall into the area of modest regulatory interest and in 
relatively few cases do regulators express a weak interest. Regulators and class actions 
appear to be concerned with similar issues. 
 
C. Regulatory Resources 
One limitation of the survey is while state regulators may be interested in the 
same issues as those being litigated, they may lack the resources to take action. It is 
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possible that regulation and class actions are substitutes in deterring harm not because 
regulators do not view deterring a potential harm as outside of their mandate but because, 
at least in some states, funding constraints limit their ability to regulate as many different 
types of harm as states with higher funding levels. 
To examine this issue, we selected four measures of regulatory stringency: the  
regulatory budget per insurance firm, the number of market conduct exams per insurance 
firm regulated by the state, the number of market conduct examiners per insurance firm 
regulated by the state, and the value of fines per regulated insurance company.  
The data on regulatory activity comes from the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) report the “Insurance Department Resources Report,” which 
according to the NAIC website “Provides an in-depth look at the resources of the 55 
insurance departments.”  Ideally, we would like information on regulatory activity 
specific to the line or allegation, but the data provided by the NAIC is not this specific. 
Figure 5 shows the relationship between budgets and the number of class actions 
filed in the state.  The insurance regulator’s budget is the broadest measure of the 
resources devoted to insurance regulation in the state. As in the case of the survey data, a 
substitution between regulation and class actions would predict that class actions are 
more frequent when budgets are tighter. The results suggest that the relationship between 
regulatory stringency and class actions is either flat or weakly positive.  When states 
provide more resources to regulators we see more, not fewer, class actions. 
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One concern is that the states budget might mask important differences in the 
scope of a state agency’s regulatory activity.  Our other measures of regulatory stringency 
are more specific. Market conduct exams are broad investigations into the business 
practices of insurers in the state.  For example, according to the Maryland Insurance 
Commissioner, 
The Compliance Unit reviews insurance company operations to determine 
how the company operates in the market place. The examiners' review 
includes, but is not limited to, sales practices, advertising materials, 
underwriting practices and claims handling practices. Examinations often 
help alert companies to problems and serve as a form of consumer 
protection. The resulting examination report presents a detailed analysis of 
a company's general business practice.33 
                                                 
33 At 
http://www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/jsp/availPubInfo/MarketConductExams.jsp10?divisionName=Market
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Although some level of investigation is regularly conducted by state regulators, there is 
wide variation in the frequency of these inspections. The New Jersey Department of 
Banking and Insurance explains that inspections 
…may be based on an increase in complaint volume, an increase in the 
frequency of complaints on a particular issue, the findings of a prior exam, 
a change in the company's market presence or the length of time since the 
last exam.34 
 
The frequency with which a firm can expect to have its business practices reviewed in the 
state as well as the number of inspectors the state retains to conduct these exams are 
useful proxies for regulatory resources.  A third measure, the budget of the state 
insurance regulatory agency per firm, is broader but has a similar interpretation.  
In Figure 6 through Figure 8 we present a plot of these measures of regulatory 
stringency against the number of class actions filed in the state. A few states, such as 
New York, stand out in the frequency with which they inspect the firms under their 
jurisdiction while several other states, such as Florida, stand out for the frequency with 
which class actions are filed in their borders, but overall, we find no evidence for the 
hypothesis that class actions will be more common in states with relatively weak 
regulatory environments. 
                                                                                                                                                 
+Conduct+Exams&pageName=/jsp/availPubInfo/MarketConductExams.jsp10 referenced on February 1, 
2007 
34 At http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/mcesteps.htm referenced on February 1, 2007 
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One possible reason for this divergence is that class actions can be filed in cases other 
than where the harm originated. A case in New York, for example, might actually cover 
harms in other states but is filed in New York because an insurer is headquartered there 
or for other idiosyncratic reasons.  Figure 7 presents the number of cases filed on behalf 
of residents of a state regardless of where the case was filed. The intuition is that a state 
with lax regulation would consistently find its residents as members of a class even if the 
cases were not filed in that state. This is not the pattern that emerges in Figure 7. Again 
states which devote more resources to enforcement appear to also be more likely to 
feature their citizens as class members. 
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 In Figures 8 to 10 we scale the number of class actions filed by the population of 
the state under the assumption that class actions may be more likely in states with larger 
population.  The scaling does change the pictures but the broad interpretation remains the 
same.  There is no evidence of a substitution effect between insurance class actions and 
the stringency of regulation. 
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Figure 9 
KY
IN
MA
IA
MO
NE
NV
DC
MD
CO
SC TX
AR
AZ
NM
TN MI
CT
PA
MN
UT
HI
WV
NJ
WY
IL
OH
AK
OR
WI
NYID
LA
AL
OK
MS
MT
FL
GA
NC
DEWA
CA
0
2
4
6
8
N
um
be
r o
f C
as
es
 F
ile
d 
in
 S
ta
te
 p
er
 1
00
0 
re
si
de
nt
s
0 .05 .1 .15
Market Conduct Exams Per Firm
Number of Cases and Market Conduct Exams Per Firm
 
Figure 10 
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The results from the previous sections provide no evidence that administrative 
regulation and class actions are substitutes in the sense that class actions are more 
frequent when regulators are either less well funded and hence have a more limited scope 
of regulatory activity nor when regulators in a survey claim that specific causes of action 
are more tangential to their regulatory mandate. We now turn to evidence on the 
frequency with which regulators involve themselves in insurance class actions.  One way 
of assessing regulatory interest is whether the frequency of regulatory involvement in 
cases themselves varies with resources. It is possible that class actions are filed without 
regard to regulatory efforts to deter the same harm but that regulators then make courts 
aware of their efforts in order to avoid duplication. 
 
D. Regulator Intervention in Class Actions 
Our survey of class action cases suggests that regulators do not typically get 
involved in class actions.  In 7.7% of the case the some government agency files a brief, 
is a party to the case or works to broker a settlement.35 In the majority of states the 
regulatory agency is never involved in the case. Moreover, as shown in Figures 11-13, 
involvement is largely uncorrelated with the resources of the insurance regulatory 
agency. 
                                                 
35 For a more extensive discussion of government intervention see Pace, supra note __, Chapter 4. 
 27
Figure 11 
AK
AL
ARAZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
II ILNKYLAMA MD
MI
MN
MOMST
NC
NE NJ
NM
NYOH
OK
OR
PA
SCTN TX
UT
WA
WI
WV
W0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
go
v_
in
vo
lv
m
en
t2
0 .02 .04 .06
Market Conduct Examiners Per Firm
Government Involvement and Market Conduct Examiners
 
Figure 12 
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Figure 13 
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The implication is that while class actions are largely filed independently of the 
regulatory environment in the state, the local agencies do intervene in these cases.  While 
the exact cause of those interventions is idiosyncratic to the case, there are several states 
which stand out as having more frequent interventions.  One issue for further research is 
why these states intervene and what the consequences of intervention in these cases are. 
The evidence presented above is inconsistent with the hypothesis that class 
actions and insurance regulation are substitutes. We find no evidence that class actions 
are used more frequently when regulators view a cause of action as outside their mandate 
or when regulators have more limited resources.  Further resources do not appear to 
determine the frequency with which regulators intervene in ongoing class action 
litigation. In the next sections we briefly turn to an alternative hypothesis on the process 
generating observed filings. 
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E. A More Precise Examination of the Substitution Hypothesis 
The preceding analyses rely on fairly aggregate measures of regulatory 
enforcement.  While we believe that resources measures, on average, will capture 
regulatory stringency, it could be the case that the regulators are simply acting in areas 
that are distinct from the issues covered by the class actions.  Although our regulator 
interest examination cuts against this interpretation of our results, at the end of the day, 
these are just measures of what the regulators say they are interested in and this may be 
distinct from what they actually spend their time and resources doing.  
To get a more precise view of how litigation and regulation interact, we examine a 
situation where many regulators or legislatures have issued rulings or orders on the 
conduct in question. While class actions do not appear to result from a gap in regulatory 
enforcement at least in our aggregate data, it is possible they result from gaps in rules.  
We examine this possibility by looking at a specific allegation’s frequency and whether 
the state regulators had existing regulatory rulings on the subject of the allegation.  
Specifically, as discussed at the outset, we focus on the relationship between state 
laws or regulatory rulings on the use of Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) parts in 
accident repairs and the frequency with which class actions alleged harm resulting from 
the practice. One popular method of reducing accident repair costs is to make the repairs 
to damaged cars using parts that are not produced by the original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM).  The potential downside to these repairs is that non-OEM parts may be inferior to 
OEM parts. 
According to the GAO 40 states have enacted some form of legislation governing 
the use of OEM parts. Of these states, 36 require companies to identify if aftermarket 
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parts are used in the repair. A warranty is required by 27 states and 23 states require a 
manufacturer’s ID for tracking purposes on any non-OEM parts. Although regulated, 
every state insurance commission and consumer product safety commission in the US 
allowed the practice and two states, Massachusetts and Hawaii, required it.36 Table A2 in 
Appendix 1 reproduces the GAO’s catalogue of regulations as of 1999. 
There has been considerable study of the safety of non-OEM parts, much of it at 
the behest of regulators. The outcome of these studies generally found that non-OEM 
parts differed only cosmetically from OEM parts and created little or no safety risk. For 
example, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety found that, except for hoods, there 
was no safety difference between OEM and non-OEM parts. Whether or not one agrees 
with the regulators’ decisions on OEM parts, it is hard to argue that the issue had not 
been evaluated and that regulators and legislators had not reached a consensus favoring 
the regulated used of non-OEM parts.37 
The fact that many states regulated the use of non-OEM parts provides a basis for 
an evaluation of class actions as a substitute for regulation.  If the states that did not have 
rules, or disallowed certain practices had more class actions, this would be evidence of 
class actions serving as a vehicle to push regulation beyond some floor.  If this were the 
case, we would expect to find those states that did not have regulations covering the 
practice of using non-OEM parts to have more OEM class actions.  If regulation is vague 
or non-existent, private attorneys can fill the void.  In fact, this is not what we observe.   
                                                 
36 GAO (2001) Motor Vehicle Safety: NHTSA’s Ability to Detect and Recall Defective Replacement 
Crash Parts is Limited. GAO-01-215. 
37 Ibid. 
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Figure 14 maps the states which had regulated OEM parts in some way (40 states) 
compared to those which had not (10 states) with filing data missing for one state in each 
category.  If class actions are filling in when regulators have not issued a decision we 
would expect to see more class actions filed in the states in which regulators had not 
issued a regulation on the use of non-OEM parts.  In fact, however, all of the states with 
above average filing totals had previously issued rulings on non-OEM parts. 
Figure 14: Cases Filed per Capita 
No (39)
Yes (9)
No Regulation
Circles represent number of filed case per capita
Solid circles denote positive deviations from the mean
Hollow circles denote negative deviations from the mean
Circle size proportional to absolute value of deviation
States with OEM Parts Regulations
 
The same is not true however when we consider cases filed on behalf of residents 
of a state but not necessarily filed in that state.  As figure 15 shows the majority of states 
with an above average numbers of suits on behalf of residents are states which had not 
issued a ruling on non-OEM parts. 
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Figure 15: Cases filed on behalf of state residents per capita 
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The results are similar when we break down the filing rates by specific regulation. 
In Table 2 column 4 we find that the number of class actions filed in a state is either 
indistinguishable in states that regulated certain practices or that class actions are more 
common in states that had explicit regulations. For four of the regulations, these 
differences are statistically significant:  (1)  States which required disclosure had almost 
one additional OEM parts case relative to those which did not require disclosure; (2) 
States which required estimates to identify non-OEM parts had an average of .93 more 
class actions during the sample period; (3) States requiring a warranty on non-OEM parts 
also had an average of one additional class action over those states that did not require 
warranties; and (4) States that had no regulation in place had .8 fewer cases than those 
with some regulation of non-OEM parts during the sample period.  In short, the existence 
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of prior regulations on the allegation under litigation has essentially no effect on the filing 
rate of class actions. 
Column 6 presents the means when we examine cases filed on behalf of residents 
of a state but not necessarily in filed in the state itself (e.g. a case filed in Illinois which 
includes class members who are residents of Missouri). We find no differences in the 
umber of cases filed on behalf of residents. 
Column 8 provides the means number of cases filed per 1000 residents. There is 
no statistically significant difference in states with and without a particular regulation, or 
any regulation. The implication of this is that more populace states are both more likely 
to be the filing location of a class action lawsuit covering OEM parts and that these states 
are also more likely to have issued rulings on the use of non-OEM parts. 
Finally column 10 provides the differences in means tests for filings on behalf of 
state residents per 1000 people. Again there are several statistically significant 
differences. When there are no laws requiring the disclosure of the use of non-OEM parts 
residents of the state are class members in 5.8 more cases per capita than states which 
require disclosure. When estimates must identify non-OEM parts residents of the state are 
class members in 8 fewer alleged class actions per capita then when estimates are not 
required to identify non-OEM parts. When non-OEM parts do not require warranties 
residents are parties in 4.29 more class actions per capita then when warranties are 
required. The requirement that non-OEM parts must contain a manufacturer’s 
identification reduces the number of class actions on behalf of state residents by 5.5 
alleged class actions. Finally having no regulation of non-OEM parts increases the 
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number of alleged class actions on behalf of residents of the state by 13.71 cases per 
capita. 
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Table 2: Existing Regulations and OEM Parts Class Actions 
Regulation  Number of 
states 
Average 
Number of 
cases filed in 
state 
T-Test Average 
Number of 
cases with at 
least one class 
member in 
state 
T-Test Filed per 1000 
residents 
T-Test Class 
members in 
state per 1000 
residents 
T-Test 
Disclosure Required Yes 33 1.061  23.12  0.13  8.85  
(2.47)  (1.32)  (0.24)  (9.28)  
 No 17 0.118 3.3 23 0.103 0.01 1.36 14.65 -5.42 
0.33  (0.87)  (0.02)  (13.54)  
Consent Required Yes 8 0.38  22.5  0.07  13.32  
(0.74)  (1.07)  (0.14)  (14.72)  
 No 42 0.81 -1.3 23.19 -0.83 0.09 -0.14 10.35 2.06 
(2.22)  (1.18)  (0.21)  (10.47)  
Estimate Identify Yes 36 1  23.11  0.18  8.6  
(2.38)  (1.3)  (0.23)  (8.96)  
 No 14 0.071 3.48 23 0.086 0.01 1.36 16.56 -6.66 
(0.27)  (0.78)  (0.02)  (14.19)  
Aftermarket of like 
quality 
Yes 10 1.2  22.7  0.12  11.24  
(2.82)  (1.42)  (0.25)  (13.4)  
 No 40 0.63 1.05 23.18 -0.56 0.08 0.25 10.72 0.40707198
(1.85)  (1.11)  (0.19)  (10.68)  
Warranty required Yes 27 1.33  23.3  0.16  6.77  
(2.68)  (1.44)  (0.26)  (6.22)  
 No 23 0.043 4.06 22.83 0.46 0.01 1.57 15.58 -9.24 
(0.21)  (0.72)  (0.02)  (13.65)  
Disclosure on warranty Yes 4 None  23.25  None  6.88  
 (0.5)   (4.2)  
 No 46 0.8  23.07 0.23 0.09  11.17 -3.78 
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(2.14)   (1.22)  (0.21)   (11.5)  
Cannot require non-OEM 
parts 
Yes 1 None  23  none  4.76  
 No 49 0.76  23.08  0.09  10.95  
(2.08)  (1.187)  (0.2)   (11.21)   
Non-OEM parts must 
contain a manufacturer 
identification 
Yes 23 0.96  23.22  0.14  8.06  
(2.01)  (1.24)  (0.25)  (6.64)  
 No 27 0.56 1.22 22.97 0.268 0.04 0.9 13.18 -5.82 
(2.12)  (1.13)  (0.14)  (13.55)  
No regulation of non-
OEM parts 
Yes 10 0.1  23  0.01  21.79  
(0.32)  (0.82)  (0.03)  (13.56)  
 No 40 0.9 -3.44 23.1 -0.12 0.11 -1.35 8.08 10.99 
(2.27)  (1.26)  (0.22)  (8.64)  
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This, combined with the evidence that class actions are more likely to be filed in 
states that did regulate non-OEM parts, provides some evidence regarding the dynamics 
of class actions filing.  Although residents of states without regulation are likely to be 
included in the case, the actions on their behalf are taking place in states with more 
regulation. The decision about where to file seems to be driven as much by the size of the 
potential class as the existing regulations in the state. The results do suggest, however, 
that states without regulation of OEM parts are more likely to have cases brought on 
behalf of their residents but that these cases are more likely to be decided in other states. 
There are reasons for concern about class actions that change the regulation in one 
state to create new regulation in another. Although the facts of these cases are complex 
and remain controversial, the important feature of the cases for our purposes is the 
plaintiffs’ allegation that non-OEM parts were in fact unsafe and hence insurance 
companies breached their contracts with policy holders by using non-OEM parts. 
Specifically, the effect of the Avery case mentioned above, at least until it was 
overturned, was to cause a number of insurance companies to switch to OEM parts.38  
In summary, we find that class action filing location is not determined by a lack of 
interest on the part of local regulators.  Nor are filings more likely in states with fewer 
regulatory enforcement resources. We do find, however, that class actions are more 
frequently brought on behalf of residents of states whose regulatory authority has not 
issued rules in a particular area but these cases are filed in states which are more likely to 
have regulations in place. Thus in all but one of our tests we find no evidence of a 
                                                 
38 Victor Schwartz and Leah Lorber. State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation Through Litigation Has 
Gone Too Far.” 33 Connecticut Law Review 1215 (2001).   
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tradeoff between regulations and class actions.  Moreover, the one instance where we do 
find evidence of a tradeoff the relationship has the unusual feature that cases are brought 
on behalf those who live in states with ambiguous regulations in states which have 
regulations specifically allowing the conduct.  
Finding little support for the standard law and economics explanation for the dual 
regulatory and litigation system, we are left seeking other explanations.  In the next 
section we turn to an alternative explanation for filing patterns where we examine the 
relationship between an industry and its regulators in political economy terms. 
II. CLASS ACTIONS AND CAPTURE 
 
A. Class Actions and Industry Capture by the Regulated Industry 
While we find little evidence that regulation and class actions are substitutes in 
deterring harm, there is an explanation for the absence of this finding that would preserve 
a role for class actions in the regulatory process.  Specifically class actions may serve as a 
method for undoing regulatory capture. 
There is a large literature in economics and political science about industry co-
opting regulators.  One of the earliest proponents of this view was George Stigler who 
argued that regulation was run largely for the benefit of industry, a state of affairs often 
labeled regulatory capture.39 Regulatory capture by industry would appear to recommend 
class actions as a backstop to allow injured parties a second venue in which to pursue 
their claim. 
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Some evidence on the role of regulatory capture in the filing of class actions can 
be found in the differences between elected and unelected utility or insurance 
commissioners.  It has been documented in several studies that states that elect their 
insurance commissioners also have lower utility and insurance rates.40  This difference is 
usually attributed to elected officials being more pro-consumer and less subject to 
capture.   
 Elections also break the “revolving door” since many insurance commissioners 
are looking for higher office and are hence less likely to have either been drawn from or 
returning to industry. The basic hypothesis is that states in which commissioners must 
face the voters are less likely to be captured by industry because voting offers a low cost 
way to punish commissioners who become too friendly with industry. If capture is 
driving the frequency of class actions, states which elect their commissioners would have 
fewer insurance class actions.  The logic is that class actions and elections would serve 
similar functions in providing a venue for consumers to reverse pro-industry rulings by 
the regulator. 
The maps in Figure 16 and 17 provide evidence relating to this hypothesis.  The 
color coding of the maps shows which states, during the sample period, elected insurance 
commissioners (blue) and which appointed (red) them. In the 31 appointed states and 11 
of the 14 elected states our survey contained information on the number of class actions 
filed in the state. The solid black dots represent states with class action filing totals above 
the mean while hollow circles represent states with filing totals below the national mean. 
                                                                                                                                                 
39  Stigler, supra note __.  
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The size of the circle represents the degree to which the number of filings is above or 
below the national mean. What is clear from the maps is that there are several states 
which stand out for the number of class action filings but these states appear to be 
similarly divided between states with elected or unelected insurance regulators. 
Figure 16: States with elected regulators and the number of class actions filed in the 
state 
No (34)
Yes (14)
Elected Regulators
Circles represent number of cases
Solid circles denote positive deviations from the mean
Hollow circles denote negative deviations from the mean
Circle size proportional to absolute value of deviation
States with Elected Regulators
 
Figure 17 depicts the map with per capita filings but with similar findings. 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 See Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate. Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence, 1 
J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 1176 (2003) and cites therein. 
 41
Figure 17: States with elected regulators and the number of class actions filed in the 
state per capita 
No (34)
Yes (14)
Elected Regulators
Circles represent number of cases
Solid circles denote positive deviations from the mean
Hollow circles denote negative deviations from the mean
Circle size proportional to absolute value of deviation
States with Elected Regulators
 
 
The mean number of cases and filings for both elected and unelected commissioners are 
presented in Table 3. The number of class actions and class actions per 100 residents of 
the state are higher in states which elect their commissioners.  This is inconsistent with 
notion that class actions are a method by which consumers can reverse the regulatory 
mandate of captured regulators. Table 3 suggests that in states where electoral institutions 
would tend to push regulators to be more pro-consumer, we in fact see more class 
actions, not fewer. 
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Table 3: Elected Regulators and Class Action Frequency 
Selection Method 
Number of 
cases t-test 
Number of 
Cases per 1000 t-test
Unelected Commissioners 12.61  2.18  
 (17.51)  (1.72)  
Number of observation 31  31  
Elected Commissioners 24.45  3.29  
 (36.69)  (2.75)  
Number of observation 11 -5.996 11 -2.01
 
In summary, we find that at least by one measure of industry  capture, states with 
elected regulators, who tend to be more pro-consumer, are in fact more likely to have 
class actions on behalf of their constituencies. This finding is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that class actions are a device for reversing anti-consumer regulatory 
decisions by a regulator who favors industry. 
 
B. Judicial Capture: The Impact of Electing Judges 
Again left without strong support for a hypothesis regarding the relationship 
between regulation and litigation in the form of regulatory capture, we seek other 
candidates.  In this section we examine two factors that potentially determine filing 
location independent of the underlying harm. Specifically, we examine measures of how 
pro-plaintiff the state’s judiciary is: judicial elections and the states previous treatment of 
class action litigation. Several authors have provided evidence that when judges stand for 
election, the parties to disputes seek to influence the outcome of cases usually by 
contributing to judicial election funds.41 
                                                 
41 There is an extensive literature in on the role of judicial elections. See e.g. Melina Gann Hall and Chris 
W. Bonneau, “Mobilizing Interest: The Effects of Money on Citizen Participation in State Supreme Court 
Elections” 52 American Journal of Political Science 457 (2008) (concluding that expensive judicial 
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At first glance, the courts seem unlikely candidates for capture.  Unlike insurance 
companies and regulators, plaintiffs and defendants are usually not repeat players in the 
courts.42 Moreover, their choice of venue is limited, meaning that capturing a judge 
would not be sufficient. Defendants would have to capture all judges who could possibly 
hear their case. One would not suspect auto liability cases to be systematically more pro-
plaintiff since anyone is equally likely to end up as a plaintiff or a defendant.  
Class actions are different in that both parties’ attorneys are potentially repeat 
players. If industry is not initiating the litigation, it is less likely to be able to capture a 
court, but the possibility of forum shopping by plaintiff’s attorneys increases the 
likelihood of judicial capture by plaintiff’s attorneys.  Stories of forum shopping and 
“litigation hell holes” abound, but in the case of class actions there is relatively little 
information on the likelihood of repeat litigation in the same venue. 
This suggests that while we may find no relationship between the electoral 
institutions used to select regulatory commissioners and class action frequency, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are choosing to file cases in states where judges are more sympathetic.  Helland 
and Tabarrok find that in states that elect judges in partisan elections awards against out 
                                                                                                                                                 
election campaigns increase the likelihood that citizens will vote in the election); Melinda Gann Hall and 
Chris W. Bonneau, “Does Quality Matter?  Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections,” 50 American 
Journal of Political Science 20 (2006) (concluding that electorate can successfully distinguish unqualified 
candidates from qualified ones); Roy A. Schotland, “Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State 
Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy? 2 Journal of Law and Politics 57 (1985) 
(arguing that raising campaign funds creates appearance of impropriety); Charles Gardner Geyh, “Why 
Judicial Elections Stink.” 64 Ohio St. L. J. 43 (2003) (same). John R. Wright, Interest Groups and 
Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence (1996).  For a discussion of the impact of judicial 
elections on tort awards see Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok, “The Effect of Electoral Institutions on 
Tort Awards,” American Law and Economics Review 4 (2):341-370 (2002) and “Exporting Tort Awards,” 
Regulation 23(2) 21 (2000) and A. Tabarrok and E. Helland. “Court Politics: The Political Economy of 
Tort Awards.” Journal of Law and Economics XLII (1999): 157. 
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of state defendants in tort cases are $230,092 dollars higher than similar cases tried in 
states that do not elect judges in partisan elections.  There is some evidence that filings 
are more likely in states that elect their judges.  Again the solid black dots represent states 
with filing above the national average during the sample period.  Three of the above 
average states have appointed judges while nine have elected judges. 
Figure 18: States which elect judges and class action filing frequency 
0 (25)
1 (23)
Elected Judges
Circles represent number of cases
Solid circles denote positive deviations from the mean
Hollow circles denote negative deviations from the mean
Circle size proportional to absolute value of deviation
States with Elected Judges
 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 There are however repeat players in litigation namely plaintiff’s attorneys.  See Helland and Tabarrok, 
supra note __ and Jason Johnston and Joel Waldfogel. Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? Evidence 
from Federal Civil Litigation. 31 J. Leg. Stud. 39 (2002). 
 45
 The election effect appears to be driven in part by the fact that larger states elect 
their judges but even when we map the number of class actions per capita more of the 
states with above average per capita filing rates are in elected rather than appointed 
states. 
Figure 19: States which elect judges and per capita class action filing frequency 
0 (25)
1 (23)
Elected Judges
Circles represent number of cases per capita
Solid circles denote positive deviations from the mean
Hollow circles denote negative deviations from the mean
Circle size proportional to absolute value of deviation
States with Elected Judges
 
In Figure 20 we examine only states which elect judges in partisan elects.  Again the 
majority of states with filing numbers above the national average are in states with 
partisan elections. 
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Figure 20: States with judges elected in partisan elections and number of class action filings 
0 (37)
1 (11)
Partisan Elected Judges
Circles represent number of cases
Solid circles denote positive deviations from the mean
Hollow circles denote negative deviations from the mean
Circle size proportional to absolute value of deviation
States with Partisan Elected Judges
 
The results are similar when we examine per capita filings.  Although the pattern is less 
pronounced the majority of the above average per capita filing rates are in states which 
use partisan elections to select their judges. 
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Figure 21: States with judges elected in partisan elections and per capita number of class action 
filings 
0 (37)
1 (11)
Partisan Elected Judges
Circles represent number of cases per capita
Solid circles denote positive deviations from the mean
Hollow circles denote negative deviations from the mean
Circle size proportional to absolute value of deviation
States with Partisan Elected Judges
 
 Tables 4 and 5 test whether the difference in means between class action 
frequencies in elected and partisan elected states is statistically significant.  The total 
number of filings is higher in states with elected judges although the per capita filing rate 
is not statistically significant. 
Table 4: Elected Judges and Class Action Frequency 
Selection Method 
Number of 
cases t-test 
Number of 
Cases per 1000 t-test 
Unelected Judges 13.6  2.33  
 (28.39)  (2.13)  
number of observation 20  20  
Elected Judges 17.63  2.6  
 (19.89)  (2.04)  
number of observation 22 -2.64 22 -0.61
 
The states which use partisan elections to select their judges the results are similar.  States 
with judges elected in partisan elections have a higher number of filings during the 
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sample period although the difference is only statistically significant for the total number 
of cases not for per capita cases. 
Table 5: Partisan Elected Judges and Class Action Frequency 
Selection Method 
Number of 
cases t-test 
Number of 
Cases per 1000 t-test 
Unelected Judges 12.58  2.27  
 (23.2)  (1.93)  
number of observation 31  31  
Elected Judges 24.5  3.06  
 (25.48)  (2.39)  
number of observation 22 -8.63 11 -1.49
 
 The question remains of how much to make of the fact that class action filings are 
similar in states which use elections to select their regulators but class action filings are 
more frequent in states using elections, and particularly partisan elections, to select their 
judges.  The results are not consistent with class actions acting as a check on captured 
insurance regulators at least to the extent that Besley and Coate and others are correct that 
elected regulators are less likely to be captured by industry.  The results are consistent 
with a broader political economy story in which interest groups compete for influence 
with the regulator.  In this case however the “regulator” appears to be elected judges.  
One explanation is the plaintiffs attorneys are filing cases in venues they think will be 
more sympathetic to their case. 
 Further research is clearly needed on the connections between the electoral 
institutions used to select judges and class actions.  For the purposes of this study it is 
sufficient to say that the evidence is not consistent with class actions being a method for 
consumers to undo regulatory capture by industry.  Whatever else may be driving the 
filing decisions of plaintiffs’ attorneys it does not appear to be related to how pro or anti 
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consumer the local regulators are. 
III. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF REGULATION ON THE NUMBER OF CLASS 
ACTION FILINGS 
 
 The previous sections have examined the correlations between class action filings 
and regulation as well as the related hypothesis that regulatory inattention due to capture 
by industry is driving class actions.  We find little evidence that class actions and 
regulations are substitutes. It is possible that our analysis misses important interactions 
between the various measures of regulatory stringency.  
In this section we present the results of a regression of each of the factors 
mentioned in this report. The dependent variable, casesijt, is the number of cases filed in 
the state i, of a specific allegation j, in year t. We divide the factors into three categories.  
The first is factors related to the substitution hypothesis which we include in xijt.  The 
factors include the log of the number of market conduct examines per firm, the log of the 
number of market conduct examiners per regulated firm, the log of the budget per 
regulated firm and the log of the number of fines per regulated firm.  In addition we 
include the proportion of cases making a similar allegation which regulators ranked as 
having a strong relationship.  The second factor, zijt, is whether the state insurance 
regulators are elected and whether the state chooses its judge using elections and whether 
the state chooses it judges in partisan elections.  The final set of factors, wijt, relate to the 
existence of previous class actions concerning a given allegation in a state.  It includes 
the proportions of cases in the previous 4 years which are remanded to federal courts, the 
proportions of cases in which the class was certified, the proportion of cases certified for 
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a multistate class, the proportion of cases certified for nationwide classes and the 
proportion of cases in which regulators filed a brief on behalf of the defendants.  The 
factors are measured both by allegation, thus measuring the outcomes of cases in any 
state or the federal system making a similar allegation, and by state, thus measuring the 
impact on future filings of the outcome of other class actions in the state in the last 4 
years. The specification,  
1 2 3 4ijt ijt ijt ijt ijtcases x z w controlsβ β β β ε= + + + +  
includes an error term clustered on the state-allegation cell.43 We also estimate the model 
using several different controls.  In all specifications we include the number of firms in 
our sample that offer insurance in the state to control for the impact of any differences in 
filings caused by market differences by state. We also include year fixed effects to 
control for the national trend (allowing for non-linearities) discussed above.  In other 
specifications we include fixed effects for state and allegation and then an interaction of 
the state-allegation fixed effects. The descriptive statistics are provided in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Cases 0.040389 0.32458 0 17
Log Market Conduct Exams -4.36489 1.212156 -6.90776 -1.24321
Log Market Conduct Examiners Per Firm -5.84973 1.03248 -6.90776 -2.46308
Log Budget Per Firm 15.94643 1.012368 13.0002 18.97122
Log Fines Per Firm -5.5933 0.930081 -6.90776 -2.30523
% of allegation with strong rank 0.274213 0.270612 0 1
% of allegation with modest rank 0.551745 0.300221 0 1
Agency Officials Elected 0.235294 0.424194 0 1
Judges chosen in election 0.470588 0.499148 0 1
Judges chosen in partisan election 0.235294 0.424194 0 1
number of out of state companies in risk set 0.972525 0.063475 0 1
Proportion of cases moved to federal court by allegation last four 
years 0.10179 0.165627 0 1
                                                 
43 This allows for arbitrary non-independence across observations for a given state. 
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Proportion of cases moved to federal court by state last four years 0.102579 0.223705 0 1
Proportion of cases with approved certification by allegation last four 
years 0.090668 0.176659 0 1
Proportion of cases with approved certification by state last four 
years 0.071095 0.169218 0 1
Proportion of multistate class actions by allegation last four years 0.024949 0.09396 0 1
Proportion of multistate class actions by state last four years 0.009881 0.058711 0 1
Proportion of nationwide class actions by allegation last four years 0.022713 0.09262 0 1
Proportion of nationwide class actions by state last four years 0.007485 0.056938 0 1
Regulators have filed briefs on behalf of the defendant in this line 0.028524 0.11737 0 1
Regulators have filed briefs on behalf of the defendant in this state 0.017489 0.088563 0 1
 
 The results are presented in Table 7.  We estimate four basic models.  Columns 1 
through 6 estimate the number of class actions of a particular allegation filed in a state in 
a given year including all of the factors and several subsets of the factors but include only 
controls for years. Column 7 includes controls for year, allegation and state while column 
8 adds a control for each state-allegation cell. The inclusion of state fixed effects 
necessitates the removal of state level variables that do not vary though time. Thus 
column 7 and 8 do not include the election variables. The difference between column 7 
and 8 is that in column 7 we utilize the variation between states to estimate the allegation 
specific variables and the variation between allegations to estimate the state specific 
variables. In column 8 we estimate the model using only the within state-allegation 
variation. This means that the state specific variables such as state population, budget, 
market conduct examiners and exams, and fines will be the same in column 7 and 8 while 
the variables capturing the state or allegation’s experience with class actions in the last 
four years will be different in the two columns. 
 Column 1 presents the full model with all of the factors. One common feature of 
all the models is that the log of population is significant and positive in all specifications. 
This suggests that potential class size is an important consideration in filing decisions. In 
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all but two of the specifications the number of companies in the survey which offer lines 
of insurance in the state but are not headquartered in the state is negative and significant.  
This suggests that filing decisions are in part determined by the location of the 
companies’ headquarters. 
We also find that an increase in the log budget causes a statistically significant 
increase in the number of class action filed in the state.  The impact is relatively modest 
as a one standard deviation increase in budget increases the number of alleged class 
actions filed in a state by 1.2%. In contrast to the evidence presented above we do find 
that an increase in the number of market conduct examiners per firm reduces the number 
of class actions in a state and as a greater proportion of a specific allegation is ranked of 
strong interest to regulatory authorities in our survey decreases the number of alleged 
class actions filed in the state. The effect is quite small with a one standard deviation 
increase in the proportion of regulators ranking an allegation as having a strong 
connection to their regulatory mandate decreases the number of class actions by .2%. 
Choosing judges in a partisan election also has a statistically impact on filings. Electing a 
judge in a partisan election increases the number of class action filings in a state by 2%.  
In column 2 we remove the regulatory rankings variable, which has missing 
observations for several allegations but find little change in the results. In columns 3 
through 6 we estimate the model including only one of our proxies for regulatory 
stringency. Our concern is that the measures are highly correlated and hence the effect of 
increasing market conduct examiners per firm while holding budget constant is difficult 
to interpret. When estimated independently all four of our measures are positive and two, 
the log of budget and fines per firm, are statistically significant. 
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In column 7 and 8 we include a more extensive set of controls. The addition of 
state controls does not alter the positive relationship between the log of fines per firm and 
the number of class actions. Although several of the state level variables are no longer 
statistically significant allegations that have more cases certified for multistate class 
status have more filings while those with a nationwide certification have fewer filings. 
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Table 7: Regression Results for the number of class actions cases filed by state, allegation and year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of state population 0.02049*** 0.01749*** 0.03784*** 0.03658*** 0.01803*** 0.02719*** 0.15573** 0.15573** 
 (0.00470) (0.00402) (0.00837) (0.00745) (0.00383) (0.00536) (0.06323) (0.06576) 
Log Market Conduct Exams -0.00283 -0.00244 0.00020    -0.00082 -0.00082 
 (0.00292) (0.00250) (0.00215)    (0.00327) (0.00340) 
Log Market Conduct Examiners 
Per Firm 
-0.00704* -0.00598*  0.00265   0.00744 0.00744 
 (0.00413) (0.00356)  (0.00344)   (0.00572) (0.00595) 
Log Budget Per Firm 0.02199*** 0.01861***   0.02154***  -0.00584 -0.00584 
 (0.00722) (0.00624)   (0.00720)  (0.00770) (0.00801) 
Log Fines Per Firm 0.01932** 0.01642**    0.01780** 0.01834** 0.01834** 
 (0.00848) (0.00723)    (0.00731) (0.00861) (0.00896) 
% of allegation with strong rank -0.02919**        
 (0.01470)        
% of allegation with modest rank -0.00629        
 (0.01696)        
Agency Officials Elected 0.02377 0.02045 0.02718* 0.02746* 0.02155 0.02524*   
 (0.01658) (0.01417) (0.01565) (0.01577) (0.01396) (0.01500)   
Judges chosen in election -0.01336 -0.01141 -0.01269 -0.01174 -0.01299 -0.00814   
 (0.01197) (0.01028) (0.01113) (0.01040) (0.01068) (0.00974)   
Judges chosen in partisan election 0.03119*** 0.02699*** 0.02163** 0.02075** 0.02382** 0.02248**   
 (0.01192) (0.01024) (0.01019) (0.01033) (0.00944) (0.01019)   
number of out of state companies 
in risk set 
-0.09850* -0.08851** -0.10524** -0.10085** -0.08560** -0.09839** -0.05528 0.32861** 
 (0.05323) (0.04500) (0.04814) (0.04694) (0.04247) (0.04704) (0.04219) (0.14168) 
Proportion of cases moved to 
federal court by allegation last 
four years 
0.08088*** 0.09602*** 0.10014*** 0.09947*** 0.09580*** 0.09698*** 0.04382** 0.04217** 
 (0.01978) (0.01814) (0.01769) (0.01775) (0.01737) (0.01803) (0.01749) (0.01841) 
Proportion of cases moved to 
federal court by state last four 
years 
-0.02478 -0.02218 -0.01379 -0.01315 -0.01767 -0.01787 -0.01731 -0.01731 
 (0.01568) (0.01364) (0.01179) (0.01152) (0.01275) (0.01303) (0.01263) (0.01314) 
Proportion of cases with approved 
certification by allegation last 
four years 
0.06768*** 0.07729*** 0.07094*** 0.07118*** 0.06869*** 0.07369*** -0.02173 -0.02172 
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 (0.01578) (0.01775) (0.01655) (0.01653) (0.01636) (0.01707) (0.02617) (0.02784) 
Proportion of cases with approved 
certification by state last four 
years 
0.03453* 0.02831* 0.02404 0.02742* 0.02440* 0.02654* -0.01169 -0.01169 
 (0.01788) (0.01525) (0.01620) (0.01554) (0.01391) (0.01566) (0.01728) (0.01797) 
Proportion of multistate class 
actions by allegation last four 
years 
1.24002*** 1.36064*** 1.42206*** 1.42484*** 1.39015*** 1.39772*** 1.04171*** 1.04294** 
 (0.38395) (0.38296) (0.37795) (0.37874) (0.37816) (0.38157) (0.39721) (0.41776) 
Proportion of multistate class 
actions by state last four years 
0.46773* 0.39475* 0.44656** 0.45369** 0.45896** 0.44496** 0.06757 0.06757 
 (0.26065) (0.22283) (0.22116) (0.22438) (0.22174) (0.22361) (0.24411) (0.25392) 
Proportion of nationwide class 
actions by allegation last four 
years 
-
1.37480*** 
-1.50195*** -1.55315*** -1.55535*** -1.51666*** -1.53249*** -1.10533*** -1.10378** 
 (0.38640) (0.38624) (0.38240) (0.38327) (0.38174) (0.38545) (0.41355) (0.43461) 
Proportion of nationwide class 
actions by state last four years 
-0.44879* -0.38008* -0.43822* -0.44420* -0.43720* -0.42694* -0.04539 -0.04539 
 (0.26480) (0.22643) (0.22603) (0.22838) (0.22633) (0.22810) (0.24577) (0.25565) 
Regulators have filed briefs on 
behalf of the defendant in this line 
0.02406 0.03599** 0.03342** 0.03212* 0.02923** 0.03337** 0.00886 0.00545 
 (0.01852) (0.01640) (0.01665) (0.01665) (0.01417) (0.01654) (0.02263) (0.02392) 
Regulators have filed briefs on 
behalf of the defendant in this 
state 
-0.06749** -0.05835** -0.06365** -0.06507*** -0.06356*** -0.05408** 0.01294 0.01294 
 (0.02691) (0.02319) (0.02484) (0.02473) (0.02411) (0.02257) (0.02050) (0.02133) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Allegation Controls No No No No No No Yes No 
State Controls No No No No No No Yes No 
Allegation*State Controls No No No No No No No Yes 
Observations 14421 16929 17064 17037 17901 17010 16929 16929 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.28 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
        
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
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One remaining issue is the impact of the outcome of previous cases on the 
decision to where to file a case. In Table 7 below we report the impact of the results of 
past cases on the likelihood of filing.  We examine two dimensions of the filing decision:  
whether to file a case with a specific allegation and, if so, which state to file the case in.   
There are a few surprises in the results.  The proportion of cases making a similar 
allegation which were remanded to federal court in the past four years actually increases 
the likelihood of future cases making similar allegations in state court.  By contrast, a one 
standard deviation increase in the proportion of cases from a particular state that are 
remanded to federal court decreases the likelihood of future filings in that state by 12.8%.   
Certification of cases making a similar allegation increases the likelihood that 
future cases making the same allegation will be filed and the more cases of any allegation 
that are certified in a state the more likely future cases are to be filed in state.  The effect 
is most dramatic with cases certified for multistate cases.  A one standard deviation in the 
proportion of cases certified for a multistate class increases the likelihood of future case 
making the same allegation 35%.  With a one standard deviation in the proportion of the 
cases a state’s courts certify for multistate class actions increases the likelihood of future 
filings by 13.2%. 
 Certification of a nationwide class has the opposite effect.  The impact is most 
dramatic for the proportion of cases making a similar allegation certified for nationwide 
class action status.  This is likely a preemption effect.  As more cases are certified for 
nationwide classes the plaintiffs for future cases have already been included in ongoing 
cases.  The negative impact on the proportion of a states cases receiving nationwide class 
action status is contrary to our intuition.  We would have expected a state allowing more 
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nationwide classes to be certified to be a more attractive venue to file cases but this 
appears not to be the case. 
 Finally, the impact of regulatory intervention in cases of a similar allegation is 
consistent with our expectations.  With increases in the proportion of cases in the state in 
which the regulator files a brief on behalf of the defendant, it is likely that future filings 
will decline. 
Table 7 
Factor 
% change in the 
number of class 
actions resulting from 
a one standard 
deviation increase 
Proportion of cases with a similar allegation moved to federal court in the  last 
four years 39% 
Proportion of cases filed in the state moved to federal court in the four years -12.4% 
Proportion of cases of with a similar allegation approved certification in the last 
four years 34% 
Proportion of cases in the state in the last 4 years in which the class was certified 12% 
Proportion of cases certified with multistate classes with a similar allegation in 
the last four years 319% 
Proportion of cases certified with multistate classes in the state in the last four 
years 58% 
Proportion of cases with a similar allegation certified for nationwide classes in 
the last four years -347% 
Proportion of cases in the state certified for nationwide classes in the last four 
years -54% 
Proportion of case with similar allegation in which state regulators have filed 
briefs on behalf of the defendant in the last four years 11% 
Proportion of case in the state in which state regulators have filed briefs on 
behalf of the defendant in the last four years -13% 
 
 The results suggest that plaintiffs’ attorneys are determining where to file cases 
based on the outcome of previous cases rather than the other factors we’ve examined.  
Filings are generally more likely where states have been more willing to certify classes 
and particularly multistate classes.  Future cases are less likely when regulators intervene 
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on behalf of defendants and when nationwide classes preempt future filings of a 
particular allegation. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that class actions and regulation are 
parallel systems at least in the context of insurance. We find little evidence that increases 
in regulatory stringency cause decreases in the likelihood of class action filings.  We also 
fail to confirm a regulatory capture story.  Plaintiffs’ filing decisions appear to be 
influenced by the previous successes in the state and with a particular allegation which 
may be affected by a form of judicial capture whereby states with elected judges are more 
class action friendly. 
When the dust clears from the current financial crisis, it is very likely that the U.S. 
will engage in sweeping regulatory reforms of the financial sector, including the 
insurance industry.  In order to optimize the welfare effects of these reforms, it is of 
crucial importance to understand the relationship between regulation and litigation.  
While theoretical models imply these two systems should serve as substitutes, we provide 
strong evidence suggesting this is not the case in reality.     
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Appendix 2 
Table A1: Most Common Allegations Cited In Insurance Class Actions 
CATEGORY CASES ALLEGATION Average DOI Rating Ranked Relationship to Regulatory Regime 
Automobile 1st party 
coverage - Diminished 
value issues 
68 Failed to reimburse policyholders for the diminished value of repaired 
vehicles. 
3.15 Weak 
Automobile 1st party 
coverage - OEM issues 
34 
Specified aftermarket parts for repairs rather than using OEM parts, 
resulting in diminished value, safety issues, or any loss (other than 
policy cost). 
3.5 Modest 
Property coverage 23 Failed to provide allowance for general contractors’ overhead and profit when paying for repairs. 
3.47 Modest 
Workers’ compensation 
coverage 
22 Conspired with the National Council on Compensation Insurance to 
charge more than approved by state Board of Insurance. 3.64 Modest 
Automobile no-fault, 
personal injury protection, 
or medical payments 
coverage – Policyholder 
issues 
21 Systematic reduction of PIP benefits through bill review computer 
program. 3.31 Modest 
21 
Used medical file review firms with reviewers who are unqualified, 
non-medical, biased, given improper incentives, or who have 
colluded\conspired with insureds to deny claims. 
4.07 Modest 
Life coverage 20 Claimed premiums would vanish over time. 4.35 Strong 
Automobile 
uninsured\underinsured 
motorist coverage – 
Policyholder issues 
19 
UM\UIM election\rejection at time of initial policy purchase issues 
(basic and\or extended\enhanced upgrade; includes misleading 
representations, invalid forms, failure to offer as required, failure to 
obtain written rejection). 
4.31 Strong 
Automobile no-fault, 
personal injury protection, 
or medical payments 
coverage - Health care 
provider issues 
15 Made inappropriate fee reductions on claims submitted under PIP 
coverage. 3.75 Modest 
Property coverage 15 Systematically performed unfair or other wrongful adjustment of claims arising from a single event (e.g. hail storm or earthquake). 4.41 Strong 
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CATEGORY CASES ALLEGATION Average DOI Rating Ranked Relationship to Regulatory Regime 
Automobile no-fault, 
personal injury protection, 
or medical payments 
coverage – Policyholder 
issues 
14 Failed to pay interest on delayed claim payments. 3.63 Modest 
Property coverage 14 
Depreciated the amount of building materials or parts or repair\labor 
costs or withheld an amount for depreciation to the premises or item on 
partial losses to real or personal property. 
3.75 Modest 
Automobile 1st party 
coverage - OEM issues 
12 Failed to disclose the use of aftermarket parts for repairs rather than 
using original equipment manufacturer parts. 4.44 Strong 
Automobile 
uninsured\underinsured 
motorist coverage – 
Policyholder issues 
12 Charged for multi-car stack coverage when actually only one car. 4.13 Strong 
Automobile coverage - 
Other issues 
12 
Failed to fully reimburse insureds for amounts (including deductibles) 
insurer recovered from 3rd party tortfeasors; including failure to pay 
interest on recovered amounts and instances where insurer failed to 
obtain recovery from 3rd parties. 
4 Modest 
Automobile no-fault, 
personal injury protection, 
or medical payments 
coverage - Health care 
provider issues 
11 Failed to pay required interest or interest on delayed payments to 
health care provider on claims. 3.27 Modest 
Workers’ compensation 
coverage 
11 
Used forms and\or rates other than those approved by Insurance 
Commissioner, the Department of Insurance, statute, regulation, or 
other authority.  
3.79 Modest 
Automobile 1st party 
coverage - Other issues 
10 
Used valuation software package designed to produce offers for 
automobile total loss at less than fair market value, actual retail price, 
fair retail value, or other required measure. 
4.06 Modest 
Automobile no-fault, 
personal injury protection, 
or medical payments 
10 Denied medical claims or failed to pay claims within time limits 
without first obtaining report from appropriate health care provider. 3.73 Modest 
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CATEGORY CASES ALLEGATION Average DOI Rating Ranked Relationship to Regulatory Regime 
coverage – Policyholder 
issues 
Automobile 
uninsured\underinsured 
motorist coverage – 
Policyholder issues 
9 
Inappropriate offset of UM\UIM payments by multiple sources of 
benefits (such as workers’ compensation or 3rd party recovery) 
previously received when only one offset is actually allowed. 
2.94 Weak 
Automobile coverage - 
Other issues 
9 Offered inadequate amounts for personal mileage reimbursement. 2.44 Weak 
Automobile 1st party 
coverage - Increased value 
issues 
8 Deducted portion of payments for vehicle repair based on alleged 
betterment in value of vehicle from upgraded parts or repairs. 3.27 Modest 
Automobile no-fault, 
personal injury protection, 
or medical payments 
coverage - Health care 
provider issues 
8 Denied medical claims or failed to pay claims within time limits 
without first obtaining report from appropriate health care provider. 3.73 Modest 
Automobile no-fault, 
personal injury protection, 
or medical payments 
coverage – Policyholder 
issues 
8 Other or undefined failure to pay proper or full PIP or MedPay 
benefits. 3.92 Modest 
Property coverage 8 
Reduced benefits by omitting sales taxes or other mandatory fees and 
charges (such as on the calculation of personal property losses or for 
building materials for partial real property losses) 
3.75 Modest 
Multiple types of 
coverages - Modal 
premium issues 
8 
Imposed premium finance service charges (or any separate finance, 
service, and\or installment charge or fee related to periodic payments) 
in violation of law or in excess of legal maximums. 
3.76 Modest 
Automobile no-fault, 
personal injury protection, 
or medical payments 
coverage – Policyholder 
issues 
7 
Systematically refused to reimburse on reasonable and customary or 
medically necessary or other appropriate basis without investigating 
particular merits of the claim or without reasonable grounds for 
making decision. 
4.13 Strong 
7 Failure to make timely payments of medical and other bills under PIP. 4.43 Strong 
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CATEGORY CASES ALLEGATION Average DOI Rating Ranked Relationship to Regulatory Regime 
Property coverage 7 
Continued to charge same or increased premiums or used an inflation 
coverage endorsement on property that depreciated (such as mobile 
homes) while only paying actual cash value rather than replacement 
cost. 
4 Modest 
Workers’ compensation 
coverage 
7 Conspired to fix prices in violation of antitrust laws. 3.47 Modest 
Multiple types of 
coverages - Modal 
premium issues 
7 Failed to disclose annual percentage rate and finance charges incurred 
when paying premiums periodically rather than annually. 2.88 Weak 
Automobile no-fault, 
personal injury protection, 
or medical payments 
coverage – Policyholder 
issues 
6 Used valuation software package designed to produce offers for 
personal injury claims at less than full and fair value. 4 Modest 
Automobile 
uninsured\underinsured 
motorist coverage – 
Policyholder issues 
6 Sold multiple UM\UIM policies to insureds with more than one car 
when only one is needed. 4.06 Modest 
6 Denied right to stack UM\UIM and BI coverages in same household. 3.57 Modest 
Workers’ compensation 
coverage 
6 Conspired to charge unduly high fees on businesses placed in assigned 
risk pool. 3.38 Modest 
Property coverage 5 Discriminated based on race by refusing to insure or only offering policies with fewer benefits in particular geographic areas. 4.47 Strong 
Property coverage 
5 Wrongly limited coverage for water or mold damage or failed to test 
for same. 4 Modest 
5 
Improperly denied foundation\slab or other below-ground claims on 
the basis of earth movement, water causes, and\or other concurrent 
causations. 
3.56 Modest 
5 
Systematically over-insured\appraised property (or used excessive 
replacement cost estimator, unnecessary mortgage requirements, 
bundling coverage, included land value, or used defective valuation 
process) to generate additional premiums. 
3.67 Modest 
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CATEGORY CASES ALLEGATION Average DOI Rating Ranked Relationship to Regulatory Regime 
Multiple types of 
coverages - Modal 
premium issues 
5 Failed to comply with Truth in Lending Act requirements for financed 
portion of the annual premiums paid on a periodic basis. 2.71 Weak 
Multiple types of 
coverages - Other issues 
5 
Failed to reimburse insureds or failed to disclose right for 
reimbursement) for lost earnings and\or other expenses related to 
liability defense provided by own insurer or other insurer-required 
legal proceeding. 
3.25 Modest 
(Allegations reported in five or more cases) 
Source: Pace et al. 2007 
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Appendix 3 State Laws Concerning OEM parts 
State 
Disclosure 
statement 
required on 
consumer's 
estimate 
Consumer 
consent 
required 
Estimate must 
identify 
aftermarket 
parts 
Aftermarket parts 
must be "of like 
kind and quality" to 
OEM parts 
Manufacturer's 
warranty 
required 
Disclosure required 
about the effect of 
part's use on 
vehicle warranty 
Insurer cannot 
require use of 
aftermarket parts 
Manufacturer's 
identification 
required on part
No 
regulation
AL X  X  X   X  
AK         X 
AZ X  X X X   X  
AR X X X  X   X  
CA X  X  X   X  
CO X  X  X   X  
CT X  X  X     
DE         X 
FL X  X  X     
GA X  X  X   X  
HI X X X X X     
ID X  X  X   X  
IL X  X X X   X  
IN  X        
IA   X  X   X  
KS X  X  X     
KY   X X      
LA X  X  X   X  
ME         X 
MD X     X    
MA X  X  X     
MI X  X  X     
MN       X   
MS X  X  X   X  
MO X  X  X   X  
MT         X 
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NE X  X X    X  
NV         X 
NH X  X X    X  
NJ X  X X X   X  
NM         X 
NY   X X X     
NC X  X X      
ND         X 
OH X X X  X   X  
OK X  X  X   X  
OR  X X  X X  X  
PA         X 
RI X X X       
SC         X 
SD X  X  X   X  
TN X  X  X   X  
TX  X        
UT X  X  X   X  
VT         X 
VA X  X   X    
WA X  X       
WV X  X   X  X  
WI X  X  X   X  
WY X X X X      
Source: GAO, 2003 
